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The Language of Law and the Practice of Politics:
Great Powers and the Rhetoric of Self-Determination in
the Cases of Kosovo and South Ossetia
Christopher J. Borgen*
"When the President [Woodrow Wilson] talks of 'self-determination' what
unit has he in mind? Does he mean a race, a territorial area, or a
community?" It was a calamity, [Secretary of State Robert] Lansing thought,
that Wilson had ever hit on the phrase. "It will raise hopes which can never
be realized. It will, I fear, cost thousands of lives. In the end it is bound to
be discredited, to be called the dream of an idealist who failed to realize the
danger until it was too late to check those who attempt to put the principle
into force." 1
2
". to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life."

1. INTRODUCTION
If international law is all but irrelevant to international relations, as some
skeptics maintain, why do states spend so much time and effort justifying their
actions under international law? Saddam Hussein attempted to justify Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait in 1990. George W. Bush attempted to justify the US's

1
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invasion of Iraq in 2003. Vladimir Putin attempted to justify the Russian
invasion of Georgia in 2008.
The immediate reaction by many is to dismiss this as "cheap talk," a
rhetorical fig leaf or simple bluster of little consequence. This Article aims to
debunk the notion that the rhetoric surrounding international law is of little
consequence. Rather than mere cheap talk, the rhetoric of international law is at
times (but not always) used by great powers (and other states) in an attempt to
gain tactical, if not strategic, advantages.
This Article seeks to elucidate what is acceptable and what is not in
modern diplomatic discourse and the relation of this acceptability to state
practice. In this sense, international law serves as both a vocabulary and a
grammar for diplomacy. International law is a vocabulary in that it defines the
words that can or cannot be used in diplomatic discourse, the terminology that is
or is not acceptable. For example, no state declares, "we choose to act as
aggressors," as it would not only be admitting to illegality, but it would also be
politically unacceptable.
Similarly, international law provides a grammar for international relations
by setting the rules by which words fit together-essentially, how ideas can be
expressed. For example, "we will use our right to attack you" does not fit into
the grammar of international law or international politics (barring some
questionable readings by the Bush Administration). As Nico Krisch has argued,
many of the central tenets of international law have remained stable over a
century or so and thus international law itself is "a prime source of legitimacy." 3
It tells us which constructions are permissible.
By cabining what can be said in international relations, international law
defines norms, shapes expectations, sets the boundaries of what can be
legitimized and, ultimately, can make it more or less likely that certain state
actions will be successful.
I will use one topic area-arguments over self-determination-and two
cases-Kosovo and South Ossetia-to explore this relationship between the
language of law and the practice of politics.
This Article begins by briefly setting the background of the Kosovar and
South Ossetian conflicts. Section III is a quick primer on the evolution of the
concept of self-determination and its at-times difficult coexistence with the
concepts of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Section IV turns to the analysis
of how legal argumentation was used by Russia, the US, and the EU in the cases
of Kosovo and South Ossetia. Although I note the relative strengths and
weaknesses of the arguments, I am less interested in who was right or wrong as
3
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opposed to what strategy was used (if any) in deploying the language of
international law. I am especially interested in how Russia, in particular, has used
the language of international law as a tool of public diplomacy in an attempt to
spin the perceptions or "control the narratives" related to both Kosovo and
South Ossetia. Finally, Section V considers how the rhetorical use of
international legal argumentation goes beyond managing perceptions and can
actually affect the evolution of the substance of international law.
Language as a social interaction defines and reinforces norms which, in
turn, are fundamental to what becomes effective law. In the case of international
law and international relations, the words used by hegemonic, or "great," powers
are especially influential. Great powers may not only use the language of law to
legitimize their actions but also to propose new definitions for existing terms
and, in time, change international law itself. For this reason alone, law talk by the
great powers is not cheap talk. It is an attempt to change the rules of the game.
II. A TALE OF Two CRISES
While this Article is too brief to give a full recounting of the complex facts
in both the Kosovar and South Ossetian conflicts, it is important to at least
describe the general background of these crises since much of the subsequent
legal argumentation is based on differing interpretations of the facts.

A. Kosovo
On February 17, 2008, the Assembly of Kosovo declared Kosovo's
independence from Serbia.4 Kosovo had been a majority Albanian province
(with a Serb minority) within Serbia and its predecessor states. Kosovo became
an autonomous province in 1963' and remained as such until 1989, when
Slobodan Milosevic rescinded Kosovo's autonomy. Throughout the 1990s,
Kosovar Albanians sought either a restoration of autonomy or independence.
In 1998, the Serb government initiated police and military actions in the
province, resulting in widespread atrocities. After political negotiations failed to
resolve the status of Kosovo and the rights of the Kosovar Albanians, in March
1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") launched a
controversial air campaign to force the Serb government to withdraw the police
and military. In the aftermath of NATO's intervention, the UN Security Council
passed Resolution 1244,6 which authorized the UN's administration of Kosovo
4
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and set out a general framework for resolving the final political and legal status
of Kosovo. For roughly the next nine years, the UN participated in the
administration of Kosovo, while political negotiations over the final status of the
territory were largely inconclusive. In December 2007, the mediators announced
the process had ended in an impasse.
On February 17, 2008, the Assembly of Kosovo issued a statement
declaring "Kosovo to be an independent and sovereign state.",7 The Parliament
pledged compliance with the process envisioned in the Ahtisaari Plan.8 The
Declaration also stated: "[W]e shall act consistent with principles of international
law and resolutions of the Security Council of the United Nations, including
resolution 1244." 9
While the US, the UK, France, Germany, and a host of other countries
formally recognized Kosovo as a sovereign state, Serbia, Russia, Romania,
Moldova, Cyprus, and other states have argued that Kosovo's secession and/or
the recognition of that secession would be a breach of international law. The
majority of states have positions somewhere in between these two poles. As of
the time of this writing, fifty-eight states have recognized Kosovo's
10
independence.
B. SOUTH OSSETIA
In the months leading up to Kosovo's declaration, South Ossetia and
Abkhazia, two separatist enclaves within the former Soviet Republic of Georgia,
became more emphatic in their own calls for independence. South Ossetians are
ethnically distinct from Georgians and have comprised a semi-autonomous
community within Georgia for seven hundred years. In the Soviet era, they were
an "autonomous region," a status that granted certain limited autonomy within
Georgia, which was a hierarchically superior "Union Republic" with greater
rights of sovereignty." In the aftermath of the breakup of the Soviet Union,
Georgia-as with all other Union Republics of the former USSR-was
recognized internationally as a sovereign state with the same borders that it had
as a Union Republic. Tensions between the South Ossetian community and the
government of Georgia, which had flared at times under the Soviet Union, rose
7
8

9
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For an updated list, see Who Recognized Kosova as an Inde endent State?, available online at
<http://www.kosovothanksyou.com> (visited May 5, 2009).
See Edward Ozhiganov, The Repu'c of Geoqia: Conflict in Abkhaita and South Osselia, in Alexei
Arbatov, et al, eds, Managing Conflict in the Former Soviet Union: Russian andAmerican Perspectives 341,
345-47 (MIT 1997).

Vol 10 No. 1

The Language of Law and the Practice of Politics

Borgen

to a new high after independence. A civil war erupted and Russia intervened,
assisting South Ossetia. Since 1992, South Ossetia has been effectively separated
from the rest of Georgia; the same holds true for Abkhazia since 1993. Russia
has maintained a military presence in South Ossetia and in Abkhazia since the
cease-fire in each region. At no point until 2008 did any UN member state
recognize South Ossetia or Abkhazia as sovereign states.
Over the course of the spring and summer of 2008, tensions once again
increased between the government of Georgia and Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
The events came to a head in August 2008. The facts are shrouded by the fog of
war and contradictory claims.' 2 Russia contends that in the first week of August,
Georgia began unprovoked shelling of cities in South Ossetia. Georgia, for its
part, maintains that prior to its commencement of shelling, South Ossetian
forces had used mortars and other artillery against Georgian villages and that this
was just the latest in a series of provocations which included the shoot-down of
Georgian unmanned aerial vehicles, roadside bombs targeting Georgian police,
13
and South Ossetian gunfire targeting Georgian villages. During that same
period South Ossetian fighters made repeated incursions into the rest of
Georgia, attacking Georgian forces and then retreating into South Ossetian
cities. Georgia claimed there was first a mortar attack by South Ossetians which
was then responded to by Georgian shelling. Russia argued that the Georgian
shelling targeted, among other things, Russian peacekeepers in the region. The
Georgian leadership responded that Russian troops were not targeted but notes
that the Russian troops often actively supported South Ossetian forces.
What is clear is that on August 8, 2008, the Russian military crossed out of
South Ossetia in force and began a two-week military campaign that ranged
through much of Georgia, attacking major ports and cities and coming within
kilometers of Tbilisi, the Georgian capital. After a brokered cease-fire, Russian
forces returned to their bases in South Ossetia. On August 26, 2008, Russia

12

13

For a recent attempt to sort out what had occurred, see C. J. Chivers and Ellen Barry, Accounts
Undercut Claims by Georgia on Russia War, NY Times Al (Nov 7, 2008).
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officially recognized both South Ossetia and Abkhazia as sovereign states. 4 In
September it signed Treaties of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance
with each. 5 Nicaragua has also recognized the statehood of these territories. As
of this writing Nicaragua and Russia are the only two states to recognize South
Ossetia or Abkhazia.
C. COMPARING CASES
In both Kosovo and South Ossetia the separatists claimed a right to selfdetermination that included secession as a remedy. In both cases at least one
great power-the US and its NATO allies in Kosovo and Russia in South
Ossetia-intervened militarily and politically, easing the path to secession. Yet,
despite the similarities of the roles that they have played, the US and Russia have
taken positions in each case that are diametrically opposed to each other.
Moreover, they have each, in varying degrees, attempted to claim legitimacy by
cloaking their actions with the terminology of international laws and rights.
In order to assess the role of the language of law in the world of
realpolitik-and how this may actually affect the substance of the law, if not the
practice of states-we must first turn briefly to how the law of selfdetermination has evolved. 6
III. A RIDDLE, WRAPPED IN A MYSTERY, INSIDE AN ENIGMA,
OR THE TROUBLE WITH CONCEPTUALIZING SELFDETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Although self-determination is a concept with its roots in the French
Revolution, it first came to global prominence in the midst of the great power
negotiations following the First World War. With the fate of imperial holdings at
stake, Woodrow Wilson turned self-determination into a guiding principle. The
problem was that no one knew exactly what it meant.

14
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Russia Recognizes South Ossetia and Abkhaia to Save People's Lives, Pravda (Aug 26, 2008), available

online at <http://english.pravda.ru/russia/kremlin/26-08-2008/106214-russia.ossetia-abkhazia0> (visited Apr 26, 2009).
See, Russia in Georgia Separatist Pact, BBC News (Sept 27, 2008), available online at
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7620972.stm> (visited Apr 26, 2009).
1 discuss the evolution and application of the law of self-determination to issues of secession at
greater length in The Special Committee on European Affairs, Thawing a Frozen Conflict: Legal
A.pects of the SeparatistCisis in Moldova, 61 Rec Assn Bar City NY 196 (2006) ("Moldova Report"),

a draft of which is available online at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=920151 > (visited Apr 26, 2009).
See also Christopher J. Borgen, Imagining Sovereigny, Managing Secession: The Legal Geography of
Eurasia's 'TroZen Conflicts", 9 Or Rev Intl L 477 (2007).
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As exemplified in the epigraph to this Article, Woodrow Wilson's Secretary
of State, Robert Lansing, was prescient in framing the issues that would spin
forth from the principle of self-determination. Who has a right to selfdetermination? Who does not? As a matter of right, to what lengths can one go
in seeking self-determination? Secession? War? These questions plagued the
American negotiators after the First World War. In late 1919, in an address to
Congress, Wilson seemed to regret having made a right to self-determination
one of his key points: "When I gave utterance to those words [that 'all nations
had a right to self-determination], I said them without the knowledge that
nationalities existed, which are coming to us day after day."' 7 Wilson was
imagining a new language but it was not clear how these new terms would affect
world affairs.
While Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points highlighted the ideal of selfdetermination-as ambiguous as it may be-the UN Charter began the process
of transforming the concept into something more than mere political rhetoric.
The UN Charter placed self-determination in Article 1, linking it to the purpose
of the organization.' 8 But, while self-determination was transforming into
something more than just rhetoric, it was still undefined.
The concept of self-determination definitively moved from an aspirational
ideal to a recognized right when it was included in Article 1 of both the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR"),
the cornerstone treaties of international human rights law. Article 1 of these
treaties states: "All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic,
social and cultural development."' 9
While these treaties legalized the concept of self-determination, there was
still the question of what the scope of this right would be-who can claim a
right to self-determination and what does that right entail?
Perhaps the single-most contested issue concerning self-determination is
assessing what is meant by the self-determination of peoples. At various points in
international legal history, the term "people" has been used to signify citizens of
17
18

19

MacMillan, Paris 1919 at 12 (cited in note 1).
Article 1, paragraph 2 of the Charter states: "The Purposes of the United Nations are:... [t]o
develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal
peace ... " United Nations Charter, art 1. The UN reiterated its commitment to selfdetermination again in article 55. Id, art 55.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), 999 UN Treaty Set 171 (1967);
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), 993 UN Treaty Set 3
(1967).
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a nation-state, the inhabitants in a specific territory being decolonized by a
foreign power, and ethnic groups.
According to Hurst Hannum of The Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy, self-determination, as understood in the 1 9 60s, was simply another
term for decolonization. The idea of self-determination during this time was not
that all peoples had a right to self-determination but rather that all colonies had a
20
right to be independent.
This analysis was reiterated by the Qu6bec Commission, a group of experts
convened by a committee of the National Assembly of Qu6bec to provide
advice concerning the legal issues implicated by a hypothetical secession of
Quebec, which stated in its findings that the right to self-determination is
context dependent, that different definitions of "peoples" lead to different
applications of the right to self-determination, and that secession is only
recognized as a remedy in the case of decolonization. 21
In other situations, as long as a state allows a minority group the right to
speak its language, practice its culture in a meaningful way, and effectively
participate in the political community, then that group is said to have internal
self-determination. In modern diplomatic practice, secession, or external selfdetermination, is strongly disfavored. From the birth of the UN, diplomats and
jurists emphasized that a right of self-determination was not a general right of
secession.22 Allowing secession would clash with the territorial integrity of states,
23
a cornerstone of the UN framework as stated in Article 2(4) of the Charter.
However, one also cannot say that international law makes secession illegal.
If anything, international law is largely silent regarding secession, and attempted
secessions are, first and foremost, assessed under domestic law.24

20

2l

2
23

24

Patricia Carley, Se/f-Determination: Sovereignqy, TerrntouialIntegrity, and the Ri'ght to Secession, Peaceworks
no 7 at 3-4 (US Inst Peace 1996). But see Antonio Cassese, Self-Determinaion ofpeoples: A legal
reappraisal51 (Cambridge 1995) (stating that by the time the self-determination language of Article
1 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights was adopted in 1955, few states
argued that the principle only applied to colonial rule).
T. M. Franck et al, The TeritorialIntegrity of.Quibec in the Event of the Attainment ofSovereignty, in Anne
F. Bayefsky, ed, Se/f-Determination in InternationalLaw: Quebec and Lessons Learned241, 248, 279-80
(Kluwer 2000).
See Cassese, Sef-Determination of Peoples at 40 (cited in note 20) (stating that self-determination does
not mean a right to secede).
The territorial integrity of states is ensured in the UN Charter, Article 2 of which states in part:
"All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations." United Nations Charter, art 2, 4.
Concerning the silence of international law, see, for example, Patrick Daillier, Alain Pellet, and
Nguyen Quoc Dinh, Droit InternationalPubhic, § 344-1 at 526 (LGDJ 7th ed 2002) ("la sdcession
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Nonetheless, a secessionist dispute may implicate international law under
specific circumstances, including, among others: (a) when a new entity seeks
recognition as a sovereign state (in which case there are rules for recognition or
nonrecognition); (b) if there is a threat to international peace and security (which
would thus likely become an issue for the UN Security Council); and, (c) if there
is an intervention by another state in support of the separatists (which may be
illegal under the UN Charter).
In general, the consensus view of the law of self-determination is
summarized as follows:
*

*

*

Self-determination for a colonized people allows for the ability to
separate the colony from the colonial state so that the colony may
gain independence and become a sovereign state;
For a state as a whole, self-determination means the right to be free
from external interference in its pursuit of its political, economic,
and social goals;
For communities that are not colonies and are within existing
states, self-determination means internal self-determination, the
pursuit of minority rights within the existing state. 25

In addition, some conclude that in noncolonial cases, "[a] right to external
self-determination ... [including at times the assertion of a right to unilateral
secession] arises in only the most extreme cases and, even then, under carefully defined
circumstances.",2627This, in the words of Professor Malcolm Shaw, is "the subject of
much debate.,
Looking at secessionist conflicts since the end of the Second World War,
only three-Bangladesh, Eritrea, and now possibly Kosovo-are possible
examples of secessions contested by the preexisting states that were both
successful on the ground and recognized by a significant portion of the

25

n'est pas prise en compte en elle-m~me par le droit international," that is, "secession in itself is
not taken into account by international law").
See James Crawford, The Creation of States in InternationalLaw 127-28 (Oxford 2d ed 2006).

26

In re Secession of.Quebec [1998] 2 SCR 217,

27

Malcolm N. Shaw, InternationalLaw271 n 140 (Cambridge 5th ed 2003). Jurists who interpret the
law of self-determination in this way generally contend that any attempt to claim secession as a
remedy must at least show that: "(a) the secessionists were a 'people,' (b) the state in which they
are currently part brutally violates human rights, and, (c) there are no other effective remedies
under either domestic law or international law." Moldova Report, 61 Rec Assn Bar City NY at
239 (cited in note 16). 1 discuss this framework at greater length in the Moldova Report at Section
II.C.
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international community. 28 By contrast, in that period there have been at least
twenty (as yet) unsuccessful attempted secessions.29
It goes without saying that the conflicts in Kosovo and South Ossetia, and
the decisions of states to recognize or not recognize the independence of these
entities, are best described as a mix of self-interest and strategy. In the next
section, we will look at how the use of legal argument does (or does not) play a
role in the strategy of great powers involved in secessionist disputes.
IV. ALL LAWYERED UP AND No PLACE TO Go: THE USE OF
LEGAL ARGUMENTS IN SECESSIONIST DISPUTES

Both cases we are considering have, to varying degrees, three related but
distinct threads of legal argumentation: (a) whether international law supports
(or at least does not deny) a claim of secession; (b) whether a separatist entity
should be recognized as a state; and, (c) the legality or illegality of the military
and/or political assistance provided by a great power to a separatist entity.30
Each argument will be considered in relation to each of these two cases.

28

29

30

But see Crawford, Creation of States at 415 (cited in note 25) (only stating that Bangladesh was a
successful secession). Crawford disqualifies Eritrea because the Transitional Government of
Ethiopia supported Eritrean independence after a plebiscite; I view this as a successful secession
because the overthrow of the previous Ethiopian government and the installation of the
Transitional Government can be viewed as part of the overall conflict. Regarding Kosovo,
Crawford wrote his analysis prior to the events discussed in this article. Instances of secession
outside of the colonial context since the Second World War include: Senegal (1960); Singapore
(1965); Bangladesh (1971); Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia (1991); the eleven successor states of
the USSR (1991); the five successor states of Yugoslavia (1990s); the Czech Republic and Slovakia
(1993); and Eritrea (1993). Crawford did not include Kosovo (as the Kosovar declaration had not
yet occurred). See id at 391. However, Crawford notes that in the cases of Senegal, Singapore, the
Czech Republic, and Slovakia, each was separated pursuant to separation agreements or
operations of their domestic constitutions. Moreover, the USSR capitulated on the secession of
the Baltic States (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia) and, as of September 6, 1991, no longer
contested their departure. The successor states of the USSR and those of Yugoslavia were formed
due to dissolution of the preexisting states, not secession. Id at 392-402.
See id at 403. The list includes: Nagorno Karabakh (Azerbaijan); Republika Srpska
(Bosnia/Herzegovina); The Karen and Shan States (Burma); Tibet (China); Katanga (Congo);
Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (Cyprus); Abkhazia (Georgia); South Ossetia (Georgia); East
Punjab (India); Kashmir (India); Kurdistan (Iraq/Turkey); Anjouan (the Islamic Republic of the
Comoros); Gaugauzia (Moldova); Biafra (Nigeria); Bougainville (Papua New Guinea); Chechnya
(Russian Federation); Somaliland (Somalia); Tamil Elam (Sri Lanka); South Sudan (Sudan); and,
Democratic Republic of Yemen (Yemen). I would add to this fist the incomplete secession of
Transnistria from Moldova.
1 set aside the competing interpretations of Resolution 1244 as they have ended in deadlock. The
EU and the US interpret the resolution as silent to the final status of Kosovo, while Serbia and
Russia argue that the resolution rejects unilateral secession. For a discussion, see Borgen, 47 ILM
at 461 (cited in note 4).
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A. GREAT POWERS AND LAW TALK IN THE CASE OF Kosovo
1. Sui Generis or Precedent?
The day after Kosovo's Assembly declared the independence of Kosovo,
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced that the US recognized Kosovo
as an independent state and further explained:
The unusual combination of factors found in the Kosovo situationincluding the context of Yugoslavia's breakup, the history of ethnic
cleansing and crimes against civilians in Kosovo, and the extended period of
UN administration-are not found elsewhere and therefore make Kosovo a
cannot be seen as a precedent for any other situation
special case. Kosovo
31
in the world today.
Similarly, in a statement to the UN Security Council on the same day, the
UK Ambassador, Sir John Sawers, said: "[T]he unique circumstances of the
violent break-up of the former Yugoslavia and the unprecedented United
no
Nations administration of Kosovo make this a sui generis case that creates
32
wider precedent-a point that all EU member States agreed upon today."
There is little or no reference to international law in the statements from
the US and the UK. As of yet, I have seen no official statement by any state
supporting Kosovar sovereignty explicitly making the argument that Kosovo is
seceding as a matter of right.
By contrast, Russia (which in many ways took the lead in arguing this issue
before the UN) and Serbia immediately made use of the language of
international law. Even prior to the declaration of independence, Russian
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov called a potential Kosovar secession a
"subversion of all the foundations of international law,... [a] subversion of
those principles which, at huge effort, and at the cost of Europe's pain, sacrifice
and bloodletting have been earned and laid down as a basis of its existence."33
Russia's position on Kosovar independence needs to be understood in
relation to its concerns that if NATO's intervention in Serbia and Kosovo's
declaration were legally justified under international law, Russia could face
similar issues concerning one or more of its own twenty-one republics, including

31

32
33

Riace Statement on Recognition of Kosovo as Independent State, America.gov (Feb 18, 2008), available
<http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2008/February/20080218150254
online
at
bpuh5.512637e-02.html> (visited Apr 26, 2009). See also Rein Miillerson, Precedents in the
Mountains: On the Parallelsand Uniqueness of the Cases of Kosovo, South Osseia andAbkhaza, 8 Chinese J
Ind L 2, 2-5 (2009) (arguing the uniqueness of a case is in the eye of the beholder).
UN SCOR 63rd Sess, 5839th mtg at 14, UN Doc S/PV.5839 (2008).
Paul Reynolds, Legal Furore Over Kosovo Recognition, BBC News (Feb 16, 2008), available online at
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7244538.stm> (visited Apr 26, 2009).
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M Similarly, many of the other vocal opponents to
Chechnya and North Ossetia."
Kosovo's independence that invoked international law were states that had their
own concerns about secessionist conflicts. The Romanian Defense Minister said
that such a declaration "is not in keeping with international law."35 The Cypriot
Foreign Minister warned against the EU "breaking international law" 36 by
recognizing Kosovo, and so on.

2. To Recognize or Not to Recognize
In arguments over attempted secessions, the issue of legality often shifts
from the question of the legality of the secession itself (about which, as
mentioned earlier, international law is largely silent; it is only clear that secession
is not a right), to the question of the legality qf the recognilion of the secession, a
subtly different question.37 The general understanding is that recognition itself is
not a formal requirement of statehood. Rather, recognition merely accepts (or
"declares") the factual occurrence of the establishment of a new state.
Nonetheless, no state is required to recognize an entity claiming statehood. To
the contrary, a good argument may be made that states should not recognize a
new state if such recognition would perpetuate a breach of international law.
Oppenheim's (Ninth) states that "[r]ecognition may also be withheld where a new
situation originates in an act which is contrary to general international law."38

34

Concerning Russian reactions to NATO's 1999 bombing of Serbia, see Ted Hopf, Social
Construction of International Politics: Identities & Foreign Polities, Moscow 1955 and 1999 249 (Cornell
2002) (quoting Grigorii Vanin and Aleksandr Zhilin for the proposition that if NATO could
claim a new "legal" basis for humanitarian intervention, then Russia or any other former Soviet
Republic was at risk of "dismemberment and destruction'). Concerning the twenty-one republics
in Russia, see Judah, Kosovo at 130 (cited in note 5). Regarding Chechnya, see Hopf, Social
Construction of InternationalPoliticsat 247 (stating that "Kosovo was read through Chechnia").
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Mu Xuequan, ed, Romania Not to Recognize UnilateralKosovo Independence, Says Minister, China View
(Dec
12,
2007),
available
online
at
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/200712/12/content_7231934.htm> (visited Apr 23, 2009). Romania has historical issues concerning
the status of the Hungarian population of Transylvania.
Harry de Quetteville and Bruno Waterfield, EU-US Showdown with Russia over Kosovo, Telegraph
(Dec 12, 2007), available online at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=
/news/2007/12/11/wkosovol 11.xml> (visited Apr 26, 2009). Cyprus has its own frozen conflict
over the status of the breakaway Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

37
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Daniel Thirer, Self-Determination, in Rudolf Bernhardt, ed, 4 Enyclopedia of Public InternationalLaw
364, 371
(North-Holland 2000) ("Rather than formally recognizing a right of
secession.., international law only became subsequently relevant within the context of
recognition.').
Sir Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts, eds, 1 Oppenbeim's International Law § 54 at 183
(Longman 9th ed 1992).
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State practice evinces that, absent a clear indication of illegality, in matters
of state recognition there is considerable deference to the political prerogatives
of outside states to decide whether or not to recognize an aspirant state.
Russia and Serbia argue that, inasmuch as Serbia did not consent to an
alteration of its territory and borders, there can be no legal recognition of
Kosovar independence. In the case of Kosovo, Russia has taken on the role of
defender of international law, using the tropes of legal rhetoric in many, if not
most, of its public statements concerning the situation in Kosovo. While not
denying the importance of self-determination, it has instead argued that selfdetermination can never dismember a state without the consent of that state. Its
arguments return to the prerogatives of sovereignty as the cornerstone of the
international system and to territorial integrity as the cornerstone of both the
modern conception of sovereignty and the UN itself.
Moreover, beyond using a vocabulary based on legal concepts, Russia and
Serbia focused on the process of decisionmaking. Time and again they
contrasted the unilateral declaration of Kosovo with the multilateral, negotiated
solution sought by Serbia, with the help of Russia.
By contrast, the US and the EU did not engage the legal issues; they simply
repeated that Kosovo was a unique case and could not be used as precedent.
Although the US referred to the ethnic cleansing as an example of the
uniqueness of the case, it did not take up possible arguments that, as a matter of
international law, a special exception for secession exists for serious cases of
human rights abuse.
Why the reticence to engage in law talk? One simple reason could have
been that the Bush Administration was disdainful of international law and did
not want to use it as a prominent part of foreign policy. But this does not
explain the EU's reticence.
One factor that may have motivated both the US and the EU was the
concern about emboldening separatists in countries like Azerbaijan, Georgia,
Romania, and Spain. Some diplomats may have been concerned that if the US
and EU were seen as opening the door to secession, even by just saying that
secession in-and-of-itself was not illegal under international law, then the
situation would worsen in other secessionist conflicts.
Finally, while law talk by great powers can sometimes change the views of
others on international law, one must keep in mind that the fineries of legal
analysis would have as much chance of surviving in the midst of the heat of a
possible secession as a snowflake in a blast furnace. Serbia and Russia could use
legal rhetoric because they used simple and understandable concepts: you cannot
dismember a state without the consent of that state, and so on. It is unlikely that
a response by the US and the EU that went into the ambiguities of international
law regarding the definition of peoples and possible remedies under customary
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international law would have persuaded many states, regardless of the accuracy
of their legal analysis.
3.

Referral to the International Court of Justice

Nonetheless, as time progressed and the debate over the legality of the
declaration and the recognitions became more and more prevalent in diplomatic
discourse, recognitions of Kosovo began to arrive at a slower and slower rate.
Then, on October 8, 2008, at the request of Serbia, the UN General Assembly
by a vote of 77 for, 6 against, and 74 abstaining, referred the following question
to the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") for an advisory opinion: "Is the
unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions
of Self' 39
Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law?
Consider this vote in light of the fact that, at the time, almost fifty states
had already recognized Kosovo. Nonetheless, only six states voted against the
resolution. The US voted against the resolution, arguing that it was more

39

General Assembly Res No 63/3, UN Doc A/RES/63/3 (2008). The voting record is as follows:
Infavour.
Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bolivia,
Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Chile, China, Congo, Costa
Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El
Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Fiji, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea,
Guyana, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of),
Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Madagascar,
Mauritius, Mexico, Montenegro, Myanmar, Namibia, Nicaragua, Niger,
Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines,
Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Serbia,
Singapore, Slovakia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan,
Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Timor-Leste, United Republic of
Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Against.
Albania, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Nauru, Palau,
United States of America.
Abstaining.
Afghanistan, Andorra, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain,
Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso,
Cameroon, Canada, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Grenada, Haiti, Hungary, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia,
Malta, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic
of Moldova, Saint Lucia, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Ukraine, United
Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
Vanuatu, Yemen.
UN GAOR 63rd Sess, 22d mtg at 10, UN Doc A/63/PV.22 (2008).

Vol. 10 No. 1

The Language of Law and the Praticeof Politics

Borgen

political than legal.4" The US was only able to persuade Albania, Marshall
Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, and Palau to join it in voting against the resolution.
Even though twenty EU states had already recognized Kosovo at that time,
most of the EU abstained, and those that did not abstain voted in favor of the
referral.
Even if the ICJ advises that Kosovo's declaration was illegal, it is highly
unlikely that states will withdraw recognition. So what is the political strategy
behind seeking a referral?
By persuading the General Assembly to refer the issue to the ICJ, Serbia
and Russia may have taken the wind out of the sails of recognition (at least until
the ICJ either decides not to issue an opinion or issues an opinion in favor of
independence). One would assume that early recognition of an entity claiming
statehood in a contested secession is costly talk-it not only changes your legal
obligations to that entity but possibly places you into a rivalry with the
preexisting state that is contesting the sovereignty of the new state, and it sends a
strong signal to the international community as a whole about your intentions.
However, with each additional recognition, it becomes harder for the preexisting
state to retaliate (as there are so many parties against which to retaliate), and the
claims of statehood become more grounded by the very fact that more and more
members of the international community agree to treat the new entity as a state.
At some point, it may actually be costly not to recognize the new state, which is
now part of international organizations, treaty regimes, etc. So, as the number of
recognitions increases, each additional recognition reduces the cost for further
recognitions. As the cost of recognition decreases, additional states are more
likely to recognize as a state that entity seeking recognition.
However, the situation can change such that recognition will require
additional costs. That is what asking for a referral to the ICJ did. States suddenly
had the additional cost not only of recognition but also of being seen to
denigrate the world court, international law, and the sovereign right to territorial
integrity. Among the statements made prior to the vote by states that recognized
Kosovo but voted for a referral of the issue to the ICJ, the most common
reasons cited for supporting the referral were support for international law as a
regime, support for the ICJ as an institution, and respect for the sovereign
prerogative of a state to make its case before the ICJ." Thus, even states that

40

41

See UN Doc A/63/PV.22 at 4-5 (cited in note 39Error! Reference source not found.); see also
UN Seeks World Court Kosovo View, BBC News (Oct 9, 2008), available online at
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7658103.stm> (visited Apr 26, 2009).
See generally UN Doc A/63/PV.22 (2008) (cited in note 39) By way of examples, see the
statements of the representatives from Mexico, Romania, Slovakia, Panama, Egypt, Spain, and
Greece. Id at 5-8.
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had recognized Kosovo found it too costly to vote against a referral (with the
exception of the US and a few small states). And those which had not yet
recognized Kosovo were suddenly in a position of recognition becoming costly
once again because they would have to choose to recognize an entity even
though the issue was a pending matter before the ICJ. To do this before the ICJ
had the opportunity to render its opinion could be seen by many as flouting the
42
prerogatives of the UN, and of the ICJ in particular.
Nonetheless, with fifty-eight states recognizing Kosovo, including almost
all of the EU, Kosovo will likely be able to act as a sovereign state, albeit on a
smaller stage, even if it has an adverse advisory opinion. The main result of such
an opinion effectively would be to deny Kosovo's entrance into the UN (and,
likely, other global institutions) and to force it to be a perpetual ward of the EU
and the US.
Meanwhile, as Russia was arguing that Kosovo's declaration was an affront
to the territorial integrity of Serbia, Russia invaded Georgia, assisting the
secession of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. And in a rhetorical high wire act, it
invoked international law as a justification for its actions.
B. LEGAL ARGUMENTS AND ARTILLERY BARRAGES IN SOUTH
OSSETIA
In 2006, while he was still Russia's President, Vladimir Putin asked: "If
people in Kosovo can be granted full independence.., why then should we
deny it to Abkhazia and South Ossetia? ' 43 In trying to follow this line of
reasoning, while still maintaining its legal arguments in regards to Kosovo,
Russia first sought to justify its intervention based on the concept of selfdefense, as well as more controversial arguments based on the defense of
nationals in other countries and the responsibility to protect. It also staked out a
case for South Ossetia and Abkhazia's secessions based on its interpretation of
the interrelations of sovereignty and the "will of the people."' Russia's
arguments exemplify three aspects of the use of international law by great
powers: (a) how great powers can use legal ambiguity to their advantage; (b) how
great powers can be powerful interpreters that attract other states who also wish
to reinterpret international law in a similar manner; but also (c) the limits of
42

Nonetheless there have been recognitions since the referral: Montenegro, Macedonia, the United
Arab Emirates, Malaysia, Micronesia, Panama, Maldives, Palau, and Gambia have recognized
Kosovo between October 8, 2008 and this writing. Who Recognized Kosova (cited in note 10).
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Judah, Kosovo at 132 (cited in note 5).
France: Cease-fire, Not Peace Reached in Georgia, CNN (Aug 12, 2008), available online at
<http://m.cnn.com/cnn/ne/europe/detail/152454/full;jsessionid=C9FD314B01097D84948AA
65564E6C32E> (visited Apr 26, 2009).
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attempting reinterpretation when the views of the broader community are too
well entrenched.
1. The Best Defense...
The moment Russia invaded another UN member state, the US and the
EU were able to refer to clear, simple international legal rules (as Russia had
done in the case of Kosovo). The US, for example, focused on classic statist
issues such as the defense of territorial integrity, independence, and
sovereignty.45
By contrast, Russia was now in the position of having to explain a foreign
military adventure into a small, poor, neighboring country in support of
separatists at the same time that it was condemning NATO countries for
facilitating the secession of Kosovo from Serbia. Yet, rather than eschewing law
talk, as the US had done in the case of Kosovo, Russia embraced legal
arguments regarding South Ossetia. In the first paragraph of his January 16,
2009 address looking back on 2008, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov
said:
The year past was very complicated, at times dramatic, packed with major
the
impacted
gravely
most
which
events
contradictory
situation... [including] the unilateral-contrary to international lawrecognition of Kosovo's independence; and, of course, Georgia's aggression
against South Ossetia, which did not achieve its goals thanks only to the
in line with our international obligations
actions of Russia, which fully
46
suppressed this illegal move.
Russia's basic argument justifying its use of military force was one of selfdefense. 47 A secondary argument was that Russia was acting as a guarantor of
peace in the region and had intervened to protect both South Ossetian civilians
from the Georgian military and ethnic Georgians from South Ossetian reprisals.
At times, Russian officials also made comments justifying the intervention in
order to protect Russian citizens in South Ossetia.

45

46

47

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Remarks after the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the Level
of Foreign Ministers (Aug 19, 2008), available online at <http://saraevo.usembassy.gov/
georgia_20080819.html> (visited Apr 26, 2009).
Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov, Remarks and Response to Questions at Press
Conference on 2008 Foreign Poliy Outcomes at MFA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian
<http://www.mid.ru/brp 4.nsf/0/
online at
16, 2009), available
(Jan
Federation
AF09FEECD4A871A8C3257540005AECE3> (visited Apr 23, 2009).
Breakaway Republics Ony Trust Russian Peacekeepers-Medvedev, Russia Today 1:55-2:20 (Aug 15,
2008), available online at <http://www.russiatoday.com/news/news/29067/video> (visited Apr
26, 2009).
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By referring to the right of self-defense, Russia justified its actions on one
of the cornerstones of the UN system. 8 At the heart of this claim is the factual
contention that Georgian forces fired first and they specifically targeted Russian
troops in South Ossetia. Its credibility will turn on the factual issue as to who
fired first and on whether the Russian response was proportional to the threat
faced. While Georgia's assertion that its shelling came only after the Russian
attack has been "shown to be highly questionable,"4 9 Russia still has a problem
when one takes into account proportionality. German Chancellor Angela
Merkel, among other world leaders, has called Russia's use of force
disproportionate."°
Thus, cornerstone of international law or not, self-defense may not be a
persuasive legal justification for Russia's actions. In August 2008, Russia tried to
obtain political support from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization ("SCO"),
a nascent security organization consisting of Russia, China, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. This attempt was largely unsuccessful,"'
perhaps evincing a reticence to ratify the extent to which force was used by
Russia. It is significant that Russia was not able to muster significant support
from SCO members for its interpretation of international law. This implies that
there was concern that once an interpretation becomes accepted in the
international community and becomes authoritative, other states, including in
48

49
50

51

See United Nations Charter, art 51, which states: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member
of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security .. " See also Russian Ministerof Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov's Aricle
Russian Foreign Poli and a New .Qualiy of the Geopoltical Situation' for Diplomatic Yearbook 2008
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation), available online at
<http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/bc2l50e49dad6a04c3257
52e0036e93f?OpenDocument> (visited Apr 26, 2009) ("Lavrov's Aricl):
By its answer to the Georgian aggression Russia has established a standard for
responding which is fully in line with current international law, including the
right to self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and
our concrete obligations regarding the settlement of this conflict, and with the
principles of moderateness and proportionality. Russia's actions pursued no
aims other than those dictated by the necessity of providing effective
guarantees of non-resumption of aggression against the Republic of South
Ossetia and the Republic of Abkhazia.
Charles King, The Five-Day War Managing Moscow after the Georga Crisis, 87 Foreign Aff 2, 9
(Nov/Dec 2008).
Breakaway Republics at 5:28-5:43 (cited in note 47). See also Rice, Remarks (cited in note 45):
[t]he behavior of Russia in this most recent crisis is isolating Russia from the
principles of cooperation among nations of the communities of states when
you start invading small neighbors, bombing civilian infrastructure, going into
villages and wreaked [sic] havoc and wanton destruction of this infrastructure.
That's what isolates Russia.
King, 87 Foreign Aff at 6 (cited in note 49).
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this case the states of the SCO, would be bound by that interpretation. Just as
Russia was concerned that the justification of NATO's intervention in Serbia
could lead to further interventions in the Russian "near abroad," it is likely that
members of the SCO were worried that ratifying Russia's interpretation of the
use of force would open the door to further Russian interventions throughout
the region.
Russia's second argument, invoking its role as a regional guarantor,
probably tried to call to mind NATO actions regarding Kosovo. However,
reliance on a set of events that included the NATO bombing campaign is tricky,
given that Russia does not want to ratify the NATO activities. At one point,
Russia claimed that its troops were in Gori and other Georgian cities to protect
the Georgians from South Ossetian reprisals. 2
Although Russia (until this point) had been generally referred to as a
"peacekeeper" in South Ossetia, there are a few problems with this analogy.
Russia is less a neutral peacekeeper than a "mediator-cum-supporter-cumcombatant." 3 Russia has consistently supported the separatists in South Ossetia
and Abkhazia since about 1992. At times, this support has included actual
military action-like shooting down a Georgian surveillance drone in the
summer of 2008 (prior to the start of the war). This assistance and diplomatic
support has increased dramatically since Kosovo's declaration of independence.
Secretary Rice noted, after the signing of the cease-fire in Georgia, that, "it's
quite clear that Russia has become a party to this conflict." 4
Moreover, calling to mind that secessionist conflicts are internal conflicts
and that third-party states need to respect the sovereignty of the state attempting
to resolve its internal conflict, there is a strong argument that Russia acted
precipitously and well beyond what could be expected under the circumstances.
Russia's third justification for its military intervention was that it was in
defense of co-nationals. Russia was mindful that there were twenty million
ethnic Russians who, after the dissolution of the USSR, suddenly found
themselves to be living in new states throughout the region, usually as an ethnic
minority.55 As Foreign Minister Lavrov wrote:
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See Michael Elliot and James Traub, Rssia vs. Georgia, The Brian Lehrer Show 2:59-3:44 (Aug 14,
<http://www.wnyc.org/shows/bl/episodes/2008/08/
at
online
available
2008),
14/segments/105887> (visited Apr 26, 2009).
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Dov Lynch, Engaging Eurasia's Separatist States. Unresolved Conflicts and De Facto States 21 (US Inst
Peace 2004).
Rice, Remarks (cited in note 45).

54
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Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard:American Primay and Its Geostrategic Imperatives 89 (Basic
Books 1997).
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We can't understand why those who are talking about the responsibility to
protect and about security of the person at every turn, forgot it when it
came to the part of the former Soviet space where the authorities began to
kill innocent people, appealing to sovereignty and territorial integrity. For
us, the issue in South Ossetia was to protect our citizens directly on the
borders of Russia, not in the Falkland Islands.5 6
Setting aside that there is little support among states for formalizing a
"responsibility to protect" that would allow the unilateral intervention of one
state into the domestic affairs of another state, even the more specific concept
of protection of nationals is problematic in this case. For one thing, the number
of Russian citizens in South Ossetia is due to the fact that Russia had proactively
given citizenship to many residents of South Ossetia.57 It may be more accurate
to describe these people not so much as Russian citizens but as Russian passport
holders. While there are many ethnic Russians in these regions, it was Russia's
handing out of passports to people living in South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
regardless of their backgrounds, that had given Russia the fig leaf of claiming
that it was acting in support of Russian "nationals."
But, as will be discussed later, what is perhaps most surprising about
Russia's legal arguments supporting its intervention is that they seemed to
persuade so many people, especially in the Russian "near abroad."
2. Self-Determination and Sovereignty
As in the case of Kosovo, besides the legal issues concerning external
assistance to, or recognition of, the separatist entity, there was also a series of
arguments concerning the underlying concept of self-determination. Here, the
US and the EU were able to use the relatively clear and straightforward rhetoric
of the importance of territorial integrity.
Russia needed to find a mode of rhetoric that abided by the grammar of
international law and yet somehow allowed it room for maneuver in South
Ossetia. Rather than overturning accepted concepts like state sovereignty and
territorial integrity or seemingly ignoring them (as the US had done in the case
of Kosovo), Medvedev attempted to reframe the concepts, stating that
'sovereignty is based on the will of the people' and 'territorial integrity can be
demonstrated by the actual facts on the ground."'5 8 He further explained that
Russia was not denying the principle of territorial integrity as one of the
fundamental principles of international law, it was just recognizing the "specific
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Lavrov's Aride (cited in note 48).
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King, 87 Foreign Aff at 5 (cited in note 49).
France:Cease-fire (cited in note 44).
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situation" that it is 59unlikely that the South Ossetians can live in a single state
with the Georgians.
Perhaps reading between the lines of President Medvedev's comments
about respecting the will of South Ossetians as well as Georgians and
understanding that some contradictions cannot be reconciled, German
Chancellor Angela Merkel, who was speaking at the same press conference, dryly
6
remarked that not every nation can become a separate state. "
Some commentators have interpreted Russia's argument as mimicking the
US stance regarding Kosovo and as claiming that the situation in South Ossetia
is unique (as well). Another possible implication of this argument is that if a state
does not have effective control over part of its territory then, with the passage of
61
time, it may lose juridical sovereignty over that territory.
This argument concerning Georgia's loss of de facto sovereignty or
territorial integrity is an interesting juxtaposition to the phrase, "sovereignty is
based on the will of the people." The key question is "which people?" This has
been at the heart of debates over what it means for a people to have a right of
62
self-determination. By his comments, the implication is that, in the case of the
disposition of the territory of South Ossetia, Medvedev believes that "people"
refers to South Ossetians (an ethnic sub-state group) while Georgian President
Mikheil Saakashvili would probably say that it refers to the collective will of all
the people of the state of Georgia.
If we accept the international borders of Georgia at the time of the
dissolution of the USSR, then the relevant self-determination unit would be the
state of Georgia and the "people" are all the people of Georgia (including South
Ossetia and the rest of Georgia). Even if we were to define the inhabitants of
South Ossetia as a separate people, inasmuch as South Ossetia is recognized as
part of Georgia, then the traditional view is that self-determination allows for
only minority rights within the existing state, not secession from that state. Thus,
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Breakaway Republics at 10:00-10:18 (cited in note 47).
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Id at 13:03-13:18.
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Effectiveness in fact should not be confused with legality as a matter of right. See In re Secession of
Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 146.
See also Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of InternationalLegal Aqgument
284-85 (Cambridge 2005). Foreign Minister Lavrov made a similar point to President Medvedev.
See Georgia's TeritorialIntegriy Limited-Lavrov, Interfax (Aug 14, 2008):
The territorial integrity of Georgia is limited de facto because of the war, and
this matter can only be resolved by finding mutually acceptable paths," Lavrov
told Ekho Moskvy on Thursday. "Georgia is de facto and not exercising
power in any of these cases [in Abkhazia and South Ossetia] and is a party to a
negotiation process [to determine the status of those territories]."
See Moldova Report, 61 Rec Assn Bar City NY at 264 (cited in note 16).
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for Medvedev's implied argument to be correct, even if South Ossetians are a
people for the purpose of the law of self-determination, one would also have to
agree that "external self-determination" or secession can be a remedy in cases
besides decolonization. In such a case, the South Ossetians would need to
show that they suffer extreme and persistent abuses by the government in Tbilisi
and that there is no other option for resolving this crisis. This may be the
Russian claim. As Lavrov wrote:
The possession of sovereignty presupposes the duty of a state to refrain
from any forcible action which deprives people living on its territory of their
right to self-determination, freedom and independence. By giving an order
to bomb Tskhinval and planning to use force against Abkhazia, the
Saakashvili regime trampled underfoot this norm of international law,
enshrined in the 1970 UN Declaration, and itself undermined the territorial
integrity of its state. 63
Russia seems to be arguing for the view that secession can be a legal
remedy in extreme cases. This interpretation of international law would also
support Russia's decision to formally recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Foreign Minister Lavrov stated, regarding recognition, that (as paraphrased by
the Serbian media) "Georgia's territorial integrity was destroyed by Georgian
President Mihkeil [sic] Saakashvili himself when he decided to order a
'6 4
bombardment of a peaceful town in South Ossetia last summer.
While it is beyond the scope of this Article to assess all of the legal
arguments set out by Russia in relation to the Georgian War and its aftermath,
what is particularly relevant for our purposes is how Russia invoked the language
of the law. Concerning Russia's intervention, Russian officials set out arguments
ranging from relatively solid legal concepts (although there were disputed facts),
such as its decision to claim that the Russian action was in self-defense, to
relatively controversial legal concepts (the withering of Georgia's sovereignty
due to its shelling of South Ossetia). States could thus support Russia's actions
even if they only found one argument that they agreed with. Concerning Russia's
recognition of the separatist enclaves as full states, President Medvedev applied a
formulation ("sovereignty is based on the will of the people") that implied a
certain result (South Ossetains should be able to vote for their secession) and
clothed it in quasi-legal language even though that result would actually overturn
much accepted international law, or at least paper over some sharp
disagreements. The genius of Russia's arguments is that, although they sounded
almost commonsensical, they actually were controversial at a deeper level. But
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that deeper level of legal argumentation rarely comes to light in the hurl-and-burl
of politics. So Russia was left with plausible-sounding arguments that, if left
unchallenged, could give it leeway to undertake significant interventions in its
near abroad.
3. The ICJ and Seizing the Diplomatic Narrative
Perhaps taking a page from Serbia and Russia's playbook, Georgia
attempted to seize control of the legal narrative by filing suit against Russia
before the ICJ. Georgia's case contends that the Russian Federation has
breached various obligations under the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination ("CERD'), including (among
others) launching a war of aggression against Georgia for purposes linked to
racial or ethnic discriminatory policies and the denial of self-determination;
"widespread and systematic discrimination" against ethnic Georgians in South
Ossetia and Abkhazia during the conflicts of 1991-94, 1998, 2004, and 2008;
denial of the rights of ethnic Georgian internally displaced persons; and
sponsoring and supporting ethnic discrimination by the de facto regimes in
South Ossetia and Abkhazia.6 5
Among other responses, Russia argued that this suit is not really about
racial discrimination-the subject matter of the treaty-but rather military
intervention.
Georgia requested-and received-an order of provisional measures from
the ICJ.66 Of particular interest, operative paragraph 3 of the Order states that
the Parties must:
[D]o all in their power, whenever and wherever possible, to ensure, without
distinction as to national or ethnic origin,
(i) security of persons;
(ii) the right of persons to freedom of movement and residence
within the border of the State;
(iii) the protection of the property of displaced persons and of
refugees ....67
Given the state of conflict at the time of the application, this is practically an
order to cease-fire. Georgia's strategy used the institutions of international law to
make its claims better heard. Outmanned and outgunned, they turned to the
figurative court of public opinion and to the ICJ in an attempt to gain some
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leverage. A suit arising out of alleged violations of the UN Charter or of
customary international law would not have provided Georgia with the
necessary jurisdictional hook to bring Russia before the ICJ. Consequently,
Georgia filed a suit under the CERD because Russia has accepted, via article 22
of the CERD, the ICJ's jurisdiction in resolving disputes arising from that treaty.
The result, as of this writing, is an order that Russia provide for certain
basic rights for Georgians and South Ossetians, which once again focuses the
world on the actual responsibilities of Russia, as opposed to the responsibilities
that Russia defines for itself.
C. COMPARISON OF RUSSIAN AND AMERICAN USE OF
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENTS
The difference between when and how the US uses legal rhetoric versus its
use by Russia is striking. Whereas both use law talk when the concepts are
relatively simple to describe-the US defending Georgia's territorial integrity
and right to nonintervention and Russia doing the same for Serbia-only Russia
also used legal argumentation when the case was a harder one to make (the
defense of its invasion of Georgia on legal grounds). Although the US and
NATO briefly used legal language to defend the Kosovo intervention, they
discarded this tactic upon seeing how controversial it was and instead focused
on the moral importance of stopping ethnic cleansing.
Regarding Kosovo's declaration, the US could have argued that, as a
matter of law, Kosovo could have a remedy of secession, as this was an extreme
case with persistent human rights abuses and no other solution. The US would
have been adopting an argument similar to what Russia said regarding South
Ossetia and, in any case, a legal interpretation that was highly controversial.
Rather than do this, it shied away from any legal discussion and instead simply
stated that Kosovo was "unique."6 It expressly rejected any relation to legal
precedent. As in the case of NATO's intervention, this strategy may have been
to avoid setting a troublesome legal interpretation of the right of selfdetermination that could have been applied elsewhere.
Alternatively, the United States could have simply said that while there is
no right to remedial secession, neither is secession illegal. Consequently,
Kosovo's declaration was not illegal under international law. However, it did not
make this argument, either.
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By contrast, even where Russia had an objectively weak legal argument (at
least, under the standards of dominant interpretations of international law), it
nonetheless placed the legal argument front-and-center. As a result, Russia, in
terms of its public diplomacy, maintains a rhetoric that shows its concern for the
norms of international law. By contrast, the US seems to try to duck the issue of
legality when the law does not suit its purposes. (This was especially true during
the Bush Administration, and the extent this changes in the new Administration
remains to be seen as of the time of this writing.) To this extent, Russia's mode
of argumentation appears more internally consistent than that of the US, despite
the jurisprudential difficulties of many Russian arguments-difficulties which
many people never hear about since they go unchallenged. Thus, Russia has
taken neither the moral high ground nor the jurisprudential high ground, but it
has used international law in an attempt to seize the narrative high ground.
As the US under President Bush began withdrawing from participating in
international legal regimes or refusing to join new regimes, Russia has embraced
using the language and rhetoric of international law. It perceived a weakness in
the US diplomatic stance and exploited it.
In a recent major statement on foreign policy, President Medvedev set out
the guiding principles on foreign policy. This has come to be called the
"Medvedev Doctrine." The first principle states: "Russia recognizes the primacy
of the fundamental principles of international law, which define the relations
between civilized peoples. We will build our relations with other countries69 within
the framework of these principles and this concept of international law.,
Russia uses such international legal rhetoric in its public diplomacy strategy
to juxtapose itself with the US. By contrast, in 2005 the National Defense
Strategy promulgated by the US Department of Defense warned that: "Our
strength as a nation state will continue to be challenged by those who employ 70a
strategy of the weak using international fora, judicial processes, and terrorism.',

It was surprising to see the government of the US list "international fora" along
with "terrorism" as strategies of the weak who are attempting to challenge the
strength of the US. Of course, this was also in the era of torture memos and
neoconservative commentators denigrating the very idea of international law.
Now consider what Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov wrote in early 2009:
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We will never agree to legal nihilism in world affairs, with the attitude
towards international law as a "draft pole" and as the "fate of the weak" or
with any attempts to "cut corners" to the detriment of international legality,
which is the embodiment of the moral principle in relations among states.
Indeed, international law is our ideology in international affairs. To use
Fyodor Tyutchev's phrase, we want "once and for all to establish the
triumph of law, of historical legality over the revolutionary mode of
7
action." 1
This rhetorical tactic has played well in the Russian near abroad. As Charles
King wrote:
[A] military operation that the West denounced as an act of aggression was
seen in Russia and beyond as laudable, proportionate, and humanitarian.
These views are not simply the product of Kremlin-led propaganda
efforts. They reflect deeply held beliefs about the United States' role in the
Black Sea region and about basic concepts such as self-determination and
72
democracy.
Russia has used the language of international law to play to the audiences
with which it is concerned: the publics and leaders of the former Soviet states.
The paradoxical result is that these leaders and publics are now cheering on an
interpretation of international law that actually puts them at greater risk of
unilateral Russian intervention. But, rather than a threat, they see it as upholding
international law and confronting the crony regime of the US-a deft diplomatic
move by Russia.
King also explains: "Wlhere are plenty of other countries, from China and
Venezuela to Iran and Syria, that share Russia's view of the global order."73
Consequently, Russia's interpretations of international law find a ready and
willing audience-or perhaps more of a clique than an audience. As King
emphasizes: "Russia is not alone in questioning the consistency of the United
States' responses to territorial conflicts around the world or the evenhandedness
with which the West doles out labels such as 'democratic,' 'terrorist,' or 'rogue
74
state.'

And so, when Russia speaks, many states listen very carefully. Russia's
arguments have been most successful with states with similar normative
proclivities. Russia's actions seem to exemplify its realization that the language of
international law can be used to rally the support of like-minded states that have
been outside the mainstream of international law. And so, as the US pulled back
from basing its rhetoric on international law during the Bush Administration,
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Russia actually increased its use of the language of international law as a way to
frame its foreign policy and organize support among its regional neighbors and
other like-minded states. Thus, paradoxically, Russia has increased its use of
international legal rhetoric because it was becoming increasingly skeptical of
political cooperation with the West.
But, how successful has Russia's use of legal rhetoric been? Russia's actions
to keep Kosovo within Serbia may have slowed the rate of recognitions.
However, although some have argued that Kosovo's declaration is a failure for
having garnered "only" fifty-eight recognitions (as of this writing), this is a much
larger level of recognition than what has been accomplished by South Ossetia,
Abkhazia, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Transnistria, Nagorno
Karabakh and other incomplete secessions. Those secessionist entities have held
territory anywhere from fifteen to thirty or more years and, at best, have one or
two states that recognize them. The secessionists may control territory, but they
are political pariahs. In this light, Kosovo is closer to the "successful" secessions
of Bangladesh and Eritrea than to the failed or "frozen" secessions. This may be
in part due to the willingness of many EU states to recognize Kosovo. 5 This
decreased the cost of recognition, somewhat, for other states.
By contrast, while the campaign for South Ossetia was a military victory
for Russia, it has not delivered South Ossetia's international recognition. Russia
has built a narrative that has been persuasive to an extent in the Russian near
abroad, particularly on the issue of Russian intervention. But, besides Nicaragua,
it has not actually garnered recognition for these entities as states.76
This exemplifies the limits of the use of international legal rhetoric by great
powers. As described in Section III above, the international community is highly
skeptical of secession and has built a legal regime that disfavors secession. In
some instances, where there is significant political backing by multiple states, a
significant number of states may recognize a secessionist entity like Kosovo. But
this is the exception to international politics. As of the time of this writing,
Russia has seemingly been unable to persuade more than one other state to
recognize the entities trying to secede from Georgia. Even great powers have
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difficulty finding traction when they are trying to push against well-entrenched
international legal norms, like the norm against secession.
However, this does not mean that great powers cannot change
international law with their rhetoric, just that it is difficult to do so in the face of
persistent norms. Fostering change is only one reason why great powers make
concerted use of legal rhetoric. The final section of this Article will return to the
broader question of the relation of the language of international law to the
practice of politics.
V. WHEN TALK IS NOT CHEAP
Of what use is international law? Some might say that all that we see is an
attempt to make bad acts seem not so bad. While it is obvious that great powers
use legalistic vocabulary for political ends, there is nothing simple about it. Great
powers (and other states) use-or do not use-legal arguments based on a
calculation of their political goals that include issues of reputation and future
credibility, as well as interests in maintaining or undermining the relevant legal
regime. In this last section I will consider certain implications of this
observation.
A. I Do GIVE A DAMN ABOUT MY BAD REPUTATION
On one level, states cloak their actions in legalese to foster reputations of
being lawful actors. Andrew Guzman has written extensively on the role of
reputation as a prod towards compliance to international rules. He explains that:
"A reputation for compliance with international law is valuable because it allows
states to make more credible promises to other states. This allows the state 77
to
7
agreement.
international
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negotiates
it
when
concessions
greater
extract
Without going too deeply into the rich literature on the relation of reputation
and compliance, one can respond that even if a reputation for compliance can at
times be beneficial to states, that does not mean that states will actually comply
with a legal rule. They may simply seek to conceal their noncompliance or, if that
is not possible, to differentiate their activities, in an attempt to maintain that the
78
legal rule they are allegedly breaching does not, in fact, apply.
Yet, while this is undoubtedly correct, this is not the whole story of when
states use legal language: it is not that states are either trying to maintain their
reputation through a good faith interpretation or, at least, decrease reputational
loss through the use of lousy legal arguments as a fig leaf. Rather, if we consider
77

Andrew T. Guzman, Reputation and InternationalLaw,34 Ga J Intl & Comp L 379, 383 (2006).

78

Robert 0. Keohane, InternationalRelations and InternationalLaw: Interests, Reputation, Institutions, 93
Am Socy Intl L Proceedings 375, 377 (1999).

Vol. 10 No. 1

The Language of Law and the Practiceof Politics

Borgen

the insights of constructivist legal scholars and international relations theorists,
we come to realize that the act of arguing about interpretations of international
law can ultimately change the law, without actually changing the wording of a
single treaty or court case.
B. FROM LANGUAGE TO NORMS TO LAWS

If we take the constructivist turn in legal scholarship seriously, then we
know that norms matter. Constructivists argue that individuals "do not exist
independently from their social environment and its collectively shared systems
of meanings."7 9 Our use of language-what is or is not a right, what is "selfdefense," who are a "people," and so on-plays an essential role in constructing
our social environment8. Moreover, the rules that we set up for how we use
these terms, the "rules of discourse," inform actors as to which arguments may
or may not be made legitimately.8 Consequently, "actors can learn new patterns
of reasoning and may ... begin to pursue new state interests. 8 2

This process is especially powerful in international law for two reasons.
First, the pluralist, polycephalic nature of international law means that in most
cases there is no final interpreter of what law is. In certain instances the ICJ or
another such institution may play an important role in resolving an interpretive
dispute between two or more states. However, as a technical matter, these cases
are only legally binding on the litigants, although they may be used as persuasive
evidence in subsequent disputes among different parties. More generally,
relatively few cases arrive before the ICJ and other international tribunals in
comparison with the vast array of interpretive disputes that exist (although the
number and variety of cases before international tribunals are increasing).
Consequently, the most important interpreters of international law are the
interpreters in the states themselves. Ian Johnstone applied Stanley Fish's theory
of "interpretive communities"

to international law, writing: "Interpretative

authority.., resides in neither the text nor the reader individually, but with the
community of professionals engaged in the enterprise of treaty interpretation
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and implementation."8 3 While international law skeptics would say that the use
of legal language is determined by international politics, the insight of Johnstone
and others is that how we interpret the words of international law is important
to understanding the structure of international relations:
Law structures the relations among States by providing a common frame of
reference. It is the language of international society: to present one's claims
in legal terms means to signal which norms one considers relevant and to
indicate84 which procedures one intends to follow and would like others to
follow.

Second, since customary international law is formed by consistent state
practice coupled with a sense of legal obligation, the consistent interpretation of
a particular term, such as "self-determination," can be viewed as a component of
state practice. If other states follow a norm leader, such as a great power, and
adopt the same interpretation and apply it more or less consistently, this could
lead to the formation of customary international law. Constructivists have
shown the legal academy that, in considering the formation of law, norms
matter. However, the contributions of theorists particularly interested in
communication and language have shown us that words matter. The language
that we use plays a part in constructing the social reality of international law,
which in turn affects the calculations of states as they define their foreign
policies.
C. GREAT POWERS AS POWERFUL INTERPRETERS
(WITHIN REASON)
While some states are able to be influential norm makers, most states are
resigned to usually be norm takers. In Wilhelm Grewe's history of international
law, he found that for the last five hundred years "[t]he hegemon in each case
85
led the way in formulating the international law rules of the time." Crucial to
the formulation of international legal rules are the public statements of a state,
its explanations of how it understands its rights and responsibilities, its
interpretation of treaties, and so on. How a state chooses to characterize a
situation matters. For example, is it aggression or is it humanitarian intervention?
83
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Weak states, when not banded together, tend to be norm takers. They also
tend to defend international law as a system because they see it as a check
against the unbridled use of power (even though the great powers had a primary
role in defining international law). Small states also try to follow legal rules in
order to be seen as trustworthy and to increase their reputations.
When the US was comparatively weak in the eighteenth and the early
nineteenth centuries, it wanted to be perceived as respectful of international law.
Under the Bush Administration, as a world-spanning power, the US tried to
loosen itself from the strictures of international law and increase the
indeterminacy of its rules. But these are norms to which it has socialized manyif not most-states of the international system since the Second World War.
Now these states, who have internalized various norms like nonintervention, the
territorial integrity of states, the importance of international tribunals, and so on,
have become the defenders of the international legal system both for the system
itself, and probably as a means to check the power of the US, Russia, and other
great powers. As the US and Russia have realized in the tussles over Kosovo and
South Ossetia, the "law-makers and subjects of international law are usually
identical."86
Thus, by taking up the rhetorical language of international law, great
powers hope not only to legitimize their actions, but to actually change the rules
of the game and, ultimately change law itself. Sometimes this last step would be
a step too far. In the case of NATO's intervention in Serbia in 1999, we have
anecdotal evidence that the US and others backed away from their legal
arguments justifying intervention for fear that this would lead to a new, more
lenient, norm allowing military interventions. The same is likely to have occurred
regarding the legal justification of Kosovo's declaration. Even though the US
and EU could access credible legal arguments in support of the declaration and
of their recognitions, they did not want to support a broader conception of
secession and so they did not engage in law talk but rather the vague rhetoric of
"uniqueness." Kosovo's successes in the number of recognitions it has received
is likely the result of: (a) certain states accepting-without explicitly stating sothat a population who faced the violence that the Kosovars did probably has no
other viable alternative than secession; and (b) the fact that the EU is made up
of twenty-seven states, most of which wanted the EU to speak with one voice,
which assisted Kosovo in getting a relatively large number of recognitions in one
fell swoop. This then decreased the cost to other states for choosing to
recognize Kosovo.
In the case of South Ossetia, Russia found a set of legal concepts
(concerning self-defense and the protection of nationals abroad) that, although
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different in application from how most states would have interpreted
international law, resonated with the views of a regional audience that Russia
was targeting. 8' Thus, the primary way that Russia may be changing international
law is not, at first, by convincing states of a different interpretation, but rather by
providing voice to an interpretation that resonates with norms already accepted
by a certain grouping of states. What Russia has really done is organize and
rationalize a legal argument around existing norms that have been against the
prevalent rules of international law and, possibly, started its own interpretive
community that will legitimize its actions and, in certain aspects, allow it greater
leeway.88 However, this strategy has not been successful (as of this writing) when
applied to actual recognition of separatist entities.
VI. CONCLUSION
International law, perhaps more than anything else, has become a
consensual vocabulary and grammar for how states talk about international
relations. The process of normative change is, in part, a language game in which
meanings, definitions, and constructions are contested. How we define the
substance of international law can change the community's interpretation of
what constitutes international law.
What drives a change in the vocabulary and grammar of international law is
not monocausal but rather a feedback loop: international politics affect
international law, which then affects international politics, and so on. So, while
great powers may have a privileged position from which they may attempt to
define international law, once a certain conception of law propagates through
the international system, the erstwhile norm makers can also be held accountable
to those norms that they have defined. The rules of self-determination that
disfavor secession may be one of those areas where the accepted rules-the
common grammar and vocabulary-are constraining the believability of Russian
and American claims.
However, a great power may choose to push at the boundaries of the
vocabulary by placing its actions in the grey zone between what is clearly
accepted and what is definitely prohibited. If it does this and is also able to
persuade other states to start interpreting words in the same way (or if it finds
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like-minded states that are already willing to do so), then it may lay the
groundwork for significant legal change.
The US did this in the years following the First World War when it brought
self-determination from the realm of political rhetoric and turned it-and its
limits-into key concepts in modern international law. Apparently, the US does
not want to frame Kosovo's independence as another such moment of
redefinition (or even of clarification of definition).
Russia, for its part, may be pursuing such a definitional change in regards
to its ability to intervene regionally. However, it has so far been largely
unsuccessful in its attempts to foster recognition of the separatist entities it
supports.
While the meanings of the words may not always be clear, they nonetheless
can have significant effect on international law. When great powers talk, people
listen.
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